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Abstract
In this paper a simple dynastic overlapping-generations model with
homogeneous agents is used to analyze the optimal use of capital in-
come tax, labor income tax and estate tax. The results of this analysis
add to the conventional wisdom about capital income taxation: while
it is true that in the long run the estate tax rate should be set to zero,
it is also true that other capital income taxation is a usable policy tool
even in the steady state.
The other contribution of the paper is the building of a simple
dynamic political economy model where the structure of capital taxes is
determined. In a median-voter framework with no policy commitment,
estate taxation is used too heavily as a capital-tax-revenue-collecting
tool relative to the second-best optimum for the social planner.
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1 Introduction
This paper makes two points. The first point is about the optimal long
run structure of capital taxes. One of the generally accepted results (due
to Chamley 1986) of optimal income tax theory is that if the agents have
infinite time-horizon, capital income should not be taxed in the long run.
This paper partially challenges this conclusion in an dynastic overlapping-
generations setting, where individuals are altruistic towards their oﬀspring.
This challenge comes from the fact that there are at least two types of
individual capital taxes available for the policy-maker in the real world:
estate/bequest/inheritance taxes and capital income taxes levied while in-
dividual is alive (such as interest income taxes and capital gains taxes, from
now on capital income taxes).1 When this generalization is taken into ac-
count, it is shown that the optimal policy in the long run involves no taxation
of estates, but the capital income tax is a desirable policy tool in the long
run. Thus the celebrated Summers’ argument (Summers 1981) about in-
finitely compounded deadweight loss of capital income taxation applies only
to taxation of estates. The second point of the paper is to illustrate a po-
litical economy mechanisms that biases the composition of capital income
taxes towards taxation of estates and yields a positive estate tax rate even
in the long run.
This first result is noted in the original Chamley article: given two capital
income tax tools, only one of them would not be used in the steady-state.
Chamley does not provide an analysis of the optimal tax rates in this sit-
uation since he dismissed the practicality of using separate tax rates for
“capital income used to finance consumption and estates”. It is argued here
that this is practical and that the qualitative features of the optimal system
are not very diﬀerent from the “stylized” US personal capital income tax.2
This paper takes this argument seriously and presents steady state Ramsey-
tax rules for optimal labor income and capital income taxes. Interestingly,
these Ramsey-rules are shown to be function of the parameters of the de-
mand functions of the currently alive individuals only (so intergenerational
1In this paper estate, inheritance, transfer tax and bequest tax are used interchangebly.
The model presented here is not rich enough to distinguish between inheritance tax and
estate tax.
2The current system in the US Federal taxes only realized capital gains and dividends;
and leaves the estates untaxed (below certain threshold value). The optimal system in
the model would not tax estates in the long run, and would tax dividends and realized
capital gains, but would have a deduction for reinvested dividends and capital gains.
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linkages do not matter), thus allowing potential empirical implementation.
The immediate policy conclusions of the result yielding zero estate taxes in
the long run are limited. As in Chamley’s model, it is entirely possible that
to get the economy fast to the most desirable steady state a “bang-bang”
solution using very high estate taxes (or high estate subsidies) could be
called for. For a representative agent model, whether this requires a tax or
a subsidy of estates depends on whether the economy starts with too much
or too little capital. In a heterogenous agent extension of the model, the
distribution of the ownership of the capital plays also a role for the optimal
use of estate taxes during the transition. Thus the main policy lesson of the
paper is the potential desirability of other forms of capital taxation in even
in the long run and not the estate tax result.
The other point that the paper makes is that in a median voter model
without time commitment the outcome of voting over taxation produces the
opposite result from our optimal tax program: estates will be taxed highly
even in the long run. This result relies on two assumptions: no policy
commitment and Markov voting strategies. The intuition behind this result
is following: if the commitment period of economic policies is short enough,
then most of the voters expect neither to receive nor to leave estates during
the period of the eﬀectiveness of the tax rate being currently decided. While
most of the paper deals with certain life-time, this argument would also work
with uncertain life time and learning about life expectancy environment: in
any population there is typically a small minority of people who expect to be
part of a intergenerational wealth transfer soon. Thus most young or healthy
middle-age individuals should favor higher intergenerational transfer taxes
if the period of policy commitment is short enough.
The second prediction of the political economy model is that institutions
that make policy commitments possible (such as once-for-all voting, irre-
vocable legislations, constitutional rules or more general dynamic strategies
between generations) reduce this bias in capital income taxation or make it
disappear altogether.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the eco-
nomic environment. Section 3 derives the normative results on the optimal
3The more general dynamic strategies refer to “folk-theorem” like implicit contracts
between generations, where the a generation votes in “cooperative” way with future gen-
erations, since it would otherwise be punished by future generations. Galasso and Profeta
(2002) provide a review of the use such strategies to explain issues surrounding social
security in political economy models.
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taxation. Section 4 presents a political economy model of capital income tax
determination. Section 5 concludes. The proofs of the results in section 2
are provided in the Appendices.
2 Economic Environment
We consider a overlapping generations model, where a representative indi-
vidual lives for two periods.
2.1 Individuals:
An individual, who is born on the period t has utility function
U t(ct0, l
t, ct1, b
t) ≡ u(ct0, lt, ct1) + T t(bt)
where c0 and c1 are the first and second-period consumption and l is the
labor supply in the first period, b is the bequest that an individual leaves
for his oﬀ-spring. T (b) measures the (planning) utility value that the donor
receives from leaving bequests of a size b. The bequest are assumed to
be constrained non-negative. Labor supply is measured negatively using
the Debreu sign convention, so a higher negative number in absolute value
means more labor supply.4
2.2 Dynasties and population growth
The population is growing at rate n and new generation is born every pe-
riod. The generations born on even-numbered periods form a linked dynasty,
while the generations born on the odd-numbered periods form another linked
dynasty.5
4This fairly typical normalization makes the use of standard tools of consumer theory
(like Slutsky-equation) more straightforward.
5To be perfectly correct, we assume that each generation consists of continuum of
individuals and each individual in that continuum is linked to 1+n atomistics individuals
in oﬀspring generations (to justify the price-taking behavior). This qualification is duly
noted here, but in the interest of less cumbersome language the reference to continuum of
agents is suppressed from now on.
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The dynasty’s behavior is assumed to be linked through perfect altruism as
in Barro (1974), which means that when the non-negativity constraint of
bequests is not binding, the dynasty behaves like it was maximizing a single
dynastic utility function.6 Thus starting from period 0, the dynasty that
has new members being born on the even-numbered periods has a dynastic
utility function
U0E(
©
ct0, l
t, ct1
ª
t∈E) =
X
t∈E
αtu(ct0, l
t, ct1),
where E is the set of positive even numbers.7 Similarly the dynasty that
has members born on odd numbered periods has a dynastic utility function
U0O(
©
ct0, l
t, ct1
ª
t∈O) = α
−1u˜−1(c−10 ) +
X
t∈O
αtu(ct0, l
t, ct1),
where O is the set of positive odd numbers. The first term of that dynastic
utility function refers to the initial old, whose last period consumption is the
only planning-utility relevant part of their preferences for our optimal tax
theory purposes. Note that the superscript refers always to the generation,
not the time period. This means that ct1 is the second life-period consump-
tion of a generation born at time t. This consumption happens in period
t+ 1.
In our model we assume that the initial young have an endowment A0 and
the initial old an endowmentA−1 of time zero consumption good. Thus given
prices
©
qt0, q
t
1, q
l
w
ª∞
t=0 for the consumption while young, old and labor supply
respectively at diﬀerent periods, the dynastic indirect utility functions are
VE(
©
qt0, q
t
1, q
l
w
ª
t∈E , q
0
0A0) and VO(q
−1
1 ,
©
qt0, q
t
1, q
l
w
ª
t∈O , q
−1
1 A−1), where the
last argument of the both indirect utility functions is the wealth term and the
first set of arguments are the relevant price terms.8 The demand functions
6This assumption about dynastic behavior is a strong restriction about the utility of
bequests (T (B)-function) for an individual member of the dynasty.
7In the specification used consumption enters the utility in per capita terms (this will
be important for the budget constraint) and thus the α’s are the product of pure time-
preference and potentially a weighting factor (1+n), depending on whether the dynasties
objective is to maximize the discounted sum of life-time utilities of representative (average)
members of the generations or the discounted sum of the sums of life-time utilities of the
members of the diﬀerent generations. The qualitative results of the paper are unaﬀected
by this distinction.
8q−11 is the consumer price of consumption of the initial old.
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Table 1: Demographic transitions.
Time-period “Even-dynasty” “Odd-dynasty”
t Young Old
t+1 Old Young
t+2 Young Old
t+3 Old Young
t+4 Young Old
and indirect utility functions of the two dynasties depend only even or odd-
number generation prices, so we have can normalize one of the even and one
of the odd period prices to any given value.
2.3 Production
The economy has a constant returns to scale production technology that can
be characterized by the production function
yt = f(kt,−lt),
where yt is the output and kt is capital, both normalized by the number of
young agents. The negative sign on the labor input follows from our sign
convention for the labor supply. This output can be either consumed (by
old or young private agents or by government) or saved to yield capital for
the next period. The convention on measuring capital in production is that
capital is destroyed in the production, so the production function is the gross
production function.
2.4 Taxes
In the analysis of optimal taxation it will be useful to distinguish between
two types of tax rates for consumption and labor supply. The dynastic tax
rate measures the tax-induced wedge between the marginal rate of substi-
tution and marginal rate of transformation using period 0 consumption as
the numeraire for both consumer and producer prices. The within genera-
tion tax rate on the other hand uses the first period consumption of the
6
Table 2: Prices and tax rates. Notation used: f ik = fk(k
i,−li), f il =
fl(ki,−li) and depending on t is even or odd either qˆ = q00 or qˆ = q−11 .
Within
Consumer Dynastic generation
Variable Producer Price Price tax rate tax rate
ct0 p
t
0 =
1
Πti=1f
i
k
(1 + n)t qt0
p00
qˆ
qt0
pt0
− 1 0 (numeraire)
ctw p
t
w =
ftl
Πti=1f
i
k
(1 + n)t qtw
p00
qˆ
qtw
ptw
− 1 p
t
0
qt0
qtw
ptw
−1
ct1 p
t
1 =
1
Πt+1i=1f
i
k
(1 + n)t qt1
p00
qˆ
qt1
pt1
− 1 p
t
0
qt0
qt1
pt1
−1
ct+20 p
t+2
0 =
1
Πt+2i=1f
i
k
(1 + n)t+2 qt+20
p00
qˆ
qt+20
pt+20
− 1 p
t
0
qt0
qt+20
pt+20
−1
Notation used: f ik = fk(k
i,−li), f il = fl(ki,−li) and depending on t is
even or odd either qˆ = q00 or qˆ = q
−1
1 . A separate line for c
t+2
0 is included so
the generational tax rate on bequests could be stated, i.e. what is the distor-
tion between marginal utility of first-period consumption of two successive
generations in a dynasty.
respective generation as the numeraire and is the natural concept to use for
the long run analysis. The tax rates, consumer and producer prices of the
goods and labor consumed at diﬀerent times are given in Table 2. As an
example for a result of the Table 2, the within generation t labor tax rate is
calculated as ⎡
⎣
qtw
qt0
− p
t
w
pt0
ptw
pt0
⎤
⎦=p
t
0
qt0
·q
t
w
ptw
−1.
By altering the consumer prices (after-tax prices) of labor supply and con-
sumption at diﬀerent periods of life the government can tax capital, bequests
and labor at diﬀerent rates. For the analysis of the optimal taxation, it will
be easier to work in terms of after-tax prices qt0, q
t
w and q
t
0 than in terms of
tax rates for capital, labor and bequests.
The main reason for having this non-standard two dynasties structure is
to be able to capture the fact that at any given time (period) in a real
world, there are individuals who are “not about to die” and are at least
partially saving for future consumption and not exclusively to leave estates.
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This feature is the driving force of the positive political economy results
of the second part of this paper and having two dynasties with alternating
birth-periods in a two-period model is the simplest way to capture this
concept. None of the substantive results normative optimal tax analysis
(except for notation) would change by changing the demographic structure:
essentially same results could be derived for a single dynasty where the
second period expenditure would be divided between an inter vivos transfer
from old agents to young agents and old-age consumption. Also the results
would, for the most part, be robust to inclusion of truly multi-period (more
than two period) lifetimes and many alternating dynasties.9
3 Optimal Taxation
In the representative agent framework, it is assumed that the government
has to finance a revenue need by levying any combination of capital taxes,
bequest taxes and labor income taxes. The government is assumed to have
revenue requirement G per young individual. The government objective is
to maximize the following welfare function
W = β−1u˜−1(c−10 ) +
X
t∈O
βtu(ct0, l
t, ct1) +
X
t∈E
βtu(ct0, l
t, ct1).
That is, the government maximizes the discounted sum of the utilities of the
individuals in the two dynasties. Note that the government discount factor
is for the moment allowed to be diﬀerent from the dynasties’ discount factor.
There are at least two ways to justify why the government should discount
the future less than the dynasty itself that has some claim for reasonability:
1. The dynasty’s utility function is the planning utility of the zero-period
individual. When an individual leaves bequest, those bequest yield
positive marginal utility to him, since otherwise he would have not
left bequests. The bequest also aﬀects the utility of the oﬀspring.
Thus a truly individualistic welfare function should take both of these
eﬀects into account and thus count the eﬀect of the bequest both for
the donor and the donee.
9Although the optimal capital tax rates and wage tax rates would be age-specific, if
not constrained to be constant.
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2. Constant discounting at any rate not arbitrarily close to one will lead
to excessive discounting of the utility of generations far into future.
This could be viewed as untenable ethical criterion.10
The position taken here is that while both of those claims have some intuitive
relevance, the central case is assumed to be the one where the dynasty’s
planning utility coincides with the government’s objective: extensions to
the case of α 6= β are followed when the results presented allow simple
provisions for this more general case.
The government is assumed to be able to use taxes on bequests, second-
period consumption and labor or equivalently, by choosing the producer
prices of first period consumption, second period consumption and labor.11
The government is assumed to be able to follow optimal public debt policy
and to be able to commit to a policy in the future. The latter is crucial,
since as it is well-known the optimal tax policy would be time inconsistent.
3.1 No estate tax in the long run
In this section we derive the Chamley (1983) result in the context of our
model. The approach followed here closely the approach taken in Erosa
and Gervais (2001) applied to the specific demographic structure of our
model (and the potential discrepancy between government’s and dynasties
objectives). The dual of governments problem can be written as12
10This is the view taken by Ramsey himself in his original contribution on the eco-
nomics of savings (1928) when refering to treatment of utility of future generations: “One
point should perhaps be emphasised more particularly; it is assumed that we do not dis-
count later enjoyments in comparison with the earlier ones; a practice which is ethically
indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination...” (p. 543).
11With the normalization restriction that one even-period and one odd-period consumer
price must be normalized to constants.
12In addition to the constraints and choice variables shown here, in principle the social
planner chooses asset levels for each dynasty and the division of these assets between phys-
ical capital and public debt. The social planner furthermore faces the constrains governing
the evolutions of these assets and public debt across generations and the constraint that
the bond market must clear. Given government’s ability to follow optimal debt policy
none of this matters for the analysis and in order to save on notation, these additional
variables and constraints are suppressed.
Also by choosing to present this problem as a consumption-labor tax problem we are
precluding any taxation of the initial endowments and zero period returns to capital. This
arbitrary choice of zero taxes on initial capital is made to make the optimal tax policy
question non-trivial.
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max
{qt
0,
qt1,q
l
w,kt}∞t=0\{q00 ,q−11 ,k0}
W
subject to
(αtλt)∞t=0 : (1 + n)k
t+1 = f(kt,−lt)− ct0 −
ct−11
1 + n
−G,
where the initial capital level is given by k0, q00 = q
−1
1 = 1 (a normal-
ization) and ct0, c
t
1 and l
t are solutions to the two dynasties’ optimization
problems. For example, c00 = c
0
0(
©
qt0, q
t
1, q
l
w
ª
t∈E , q
0
0A0) is the demand for
the consumption while young for the even-period dynasty’s first generation
and c−11 = c
−1
1 (1,
©
qt0, q
t
1, q
l
w
ª
t∈O , q
−1
1 A−1) is the demand for consumption
of the initial old by the odd-period dynasty. Instead of writing the period-
specific government budget constraints, we use the set of aggregate resource
use constraint (by Walras’ law). The multiplier αt in front of the Lagrange
multiplier λt is used to normalize the Lagrange multiplier to be a current-
value multiplier as opposed to present-value multiplier using the standard
vocabulary of dynamic optimization. The choice of α instead of β as a nor-
malizing factor will be useful in deriving the result on optimal taxes when
the two diﬀer. It is also worthwhile to note that while the dynastic optimiza-
tion problem could be easily presented by a dynamic optimization problem,
the government problem is not easily rendered to a dynamic optimization
problem (because, e.g. the choice of q100w will aﬀect the consumption and
labor supply decisions in period 0). That justifies the presentation of the
government’s problem as a (countably) infinite-dimensional Lagrangian.13
In order to prove the result, it is easier to analyze the problem where the
government controls directly the allocation and takes the individual dynastic
optimization as a constraint to its problem. The dynastic budget constraint
for can be manipulated as follows (using the even-period dynasty as an
example):
13As in many other dynamic optimal taxation papers, the existence of a steady state
to the optimal tax problem is postulated and not proved. Similarly, the existence of
solution to government’s problem is postulated following the tradition in the field, while
acknowledging that the use of demand functions in the constraints might lead the problem
to become a non-convex optimization problem.
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X
t∈E
(qt0c
t
0 + q
t
1c
t
1 + q
t
wl
t) = q00A0 ⇒X
t∈E
αt(ut0c
t
0 + u
t
1c
t
1 + u
t
l l
t) = u00A0,
where e.g. u0l is the partial derivative of the first period utility function with
respect to labor and where the individual first-order conditions have been
substituted to eliminate consumer prices. Now the governments problem can
be restated as:
max
{ct−10 ,ct1,lt,kt}∞t=0\{k0}
W
subject to
(αtλt)∞t=0 : (1 + n)k
t+1 = f(kt,−lt)− ct0 −
ct−11
1 + n
−G
(θE) :
X
t∈E
αt(ut0c
t
0 + u
t
1c
t
1 + u
t
l l
t) = u00A0
(θO) : α
−1u˜−10 c
−1
0 +
X
t∈O
αt(ut0c
t
0 + u
t
1c
t
1 + u
t
l l
t) = α−1u˜−10 A−1
Result 1: (No Estate Taxation in the Long Run) If α = β then q
t+2
0
qt0
=
pt+20
pt0
in the steady state. If β > α then q
t+2
0
qt0
< p
t+2
0
pt0
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Thus if the social discount rate (α) is equal to the dynasties’ discount rate
(β), then in the long run there should be no taxation of bequests. If β > α
(for the potential reasons discussed earlier) then there should be an estate
subsidy in the long run.
3.2 Lifetime Ramsey Formulae
In this section we focus on the case where β = α (private discount rate
equals the social discount rate). The governments optimization problem can
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be stated in terms of the two dynasties’ indirect utility functions. In order
to derive interesting “Ramsey Formulae” type of results, it is convenient to
start the analysis by re-normalizing the consumer prices. In order to do so,
we need to formalize the concept of being “close” to the steady state.
Let
©¡
ct0, c
t
1, l
t, kt
¢ª∞
t=0 be the vector sequence of the endogenous variables
in the economy. Pick ε > 0, where ε is an arbitrarily small number. Define
T (ε) as
T (ε) = min
©
s|t ≥ s =⇒ °°¡ct+20 , ct+21 , lt+2, kt+2¢− ¡ct0, ct1, lt, kt¢°° ≤ εª .
The analysis that follows should be understood that we have chosen a time
period T = T (ε) as the period when the economy has approximately reached
the steady state and proceed ignoring the fact that we are not exactly at
the steady state (by choosing a smaller ε, the results become more exact).
A useful way to normalize the consumer prices is to normalize qT0 = p
T
0 and
qT+10 = p
T+1
0 , while keeping the first period consumption as a numeraire
for the producer prices (this normalization is why we needed to pick a fixed
period T close enough to steady state). From Result 1 it follows that qt0 = p
t
0
for t ≥ T . For t ≥ T labor is taxed from the perspective of an individual
who is born at period t if qtw < p
t
w and q
t
1 > p
t
1 means that second-period
consumption is taxed.
Result 2: (Modified Lifetime Ramsey Formulae) At the steady state the
optimal tax rates are implicitly defined by the following equations
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ + ϕ 1
ci0
∂ci0
∂I =
(qiw−piw)
qiw
η˜ci0,qiw +
(qi1−pi1)
qi1
η˜ci0,qi1
θ + ϕ 1
ci1
∂ci1
∂I =
(qiw−piw)
qiw
η˜ci1,qiw +
(qi1−pi1)
qi1
η˜ci1,qi1
θ + ϕ 1li
∂li
∂I =
(qiw−piw)
qiw
η˜li,qiw +
(qi1−pi1)
qi1
η˜li,qi1 ,
where e.g. η˜ci0,qiw is the compensated demand elasticity of first period con-
sumption with respect to net wage rate,
∂ci0
∂I is the derivative of first period
consumption with respect to unearned income (dynasty’s starting wealth)
and where θ and ϕ are constants independent of the time-period i.
Proof: See Appendix B.
These are the lifetime Ramsey formulae that apply in the steady state: the
optimal tax rates for capital gains and labor can be solved by just using six
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compensated elasticities and three income (or wealth) semi-elasticities.14
All the required parameters could be in principle estimated just using life-
time price variation and consumption data. So as in the classic Ramsey rule,
checking whether a given tax system satisfies the necessary conditions for
the social optimum, one just needs to eliminate parameters (here two, in
classical Ramsey one) from a system of equations and to see whether the
implied equalities are satisfied.15
Example 1. Equal income eﬀects on second period consumption and labor:
Suppose that 1
ci1
∂ci1
∂I =
1
li
∂li
∂I . The last two equations of the system simplify to
the classical Ramsey rule, where the only relevant price changes are the life
time price changes. Note that this either requires that the income eﬀects on
labor supply and second period consumption are zero or that either leisure
or second period consumption is an inferior good.
Example 2. Within generation utility quasi-linear in first period consump-
tion: Suppose that u(c0, c1, l) = g(co + h(c1) + j(l)), where g, h and j are
convex functions. Following similar line of reasoning as in the appendix
it is easy to show that
∂ci1
∂I =
∂li
∂I =
∂c˜i1
∂qtw
= 0. The tax rule simplifies to
(qi1−pi1)
qi1
η˜ci0,qi1 =
(qiw−piw)
qiw
η˜li,qiw , or to the “inverse elasticity” rule for the tax
rate, which approximately states that the tax rate should be inversely related
to the own-price elasticity of demand.16
Example 3: Equal income eﬀect on first and second period consumption:
1
ci0
∂ci0
∂I =
1
ci1
∂ci1
∂I . This probably is the empirically most plausible special case.
Now we have a modified tax rule that states
14These are referred as semielasticities since a dynasty may start with zero wealth in
the first period.
15By choosing normalizations rightly, it is easy to show that the same equations (with
normalization for q00 chosen so that q
i
0 = p
i
0 in the optimum) apply also on the transition
path to steady state. This is however, not very useful as a a property, since we could only
solve the ratio of the labor and capital gains tax based on the equation, the level would
depend on the level of estate tax in place. So only in the steady state, where we know that
estate tax is zero, can these equations truly be applied.
16This claim is not exact, since the denominator in the inverse elasticity rule is the
consumer price and not the producer price, so the multipliers in front of the elasticities
are tax shares of the final price and not tax rates.
Also note how the signing convention for labor supply works here, while the net wage
compensated derivative of labor supply is negative, the elasticity is positive (unlike other
own-price compensated elasticities, which are negative). This means that there will be a
tax on labor (qiw < p
i
w) and a tax on second period consumption (q
i
1 > p
i
1).
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¡
qiw − piw
¢
qiw
³
η˜ci0,qiw − η˜ci1,qiw
´
=
¡
qi1 − pi1
¢
qi1
³
η˜ci1,qi1 − η˜ci0,qi1
´
.
Assuming that first and second period consumption are Hicksian substi-
tutes, this rule then states that if the compensated elasticity of first and
second period consumption with respect to wage rate are equal, then the
tax rate on second period consumption should be zero. Furthermore, if the
first period consumption is more complementary to labor supply than sec-
ond period consumption
³
η˜ci0,qiw > η˜ci1,qiw
´
then the tax rate on second period
consumption should be positive (otherwise there should be saving subsidy).
This result is parallel to the classical result of Corlett and Hague (1953)
in commodity taxation and the result of Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) in
the case of capital income taxation in overlapping generations model with
government debt.
Examples 1-3 are given to illustrate the easy applicability of the optimal
tax rules. Example 2 provides an example of a situation where the capital
gains tax must be strictly positive, since the implied equality (for positive
government revenue requirement) implies that both wage and capital gains
taxes should be used. Example 3 also, under plausible assumptions about
complementarity between consumption and labor supply generates a tax
on second period consumption. It is postulated that for many reasonable
assumptions about the relevant elasticities the capital gains tax is strictly
positive.
3.3 Qualitative properties of the optimal long run taxes
The qualitative properties of optimal steady state taxes have an appealing
feature: they resemble an existing real-world structure of capital and income
taxes. The optimal system in a two-period world could be implemented as
the following tax system:
1. Labor income is taxed.
2. Realized capital gains are taxed in the second period. In a multi-asset
world, if assets are sold, then reinvested gains are deducted from the
tax base. Dividends and interest payments are taxed, but the amount
of that is reinvested is deducted from the tax base.
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3. Estates are not taxed and there is a basis step-up at death. This means
that the oﬀspring pays capital gains on the diﬀerence of the value of
the assets at the time of sale and their value at the time of inheritance.
This description comes very closed to the current federal system in the US
of capital, labor and estate taxes that applies to most tax-payers (below
the threshold of estate taxation). The only diﬀerence is the reinvestment
deduction: the optimal tax system here calls for only the asset income that
is consumed to be taxed.
There are two questions that come immediately mind in practical imple-
mentation or relevance of this tax system. The first is the administrative
feasibility of the reinvestment reduction. This should not be prohibitively
costly, the current tax-system could be amended to capture this feature
by withdrawing taxes from capital gains, interest and dividend payments
at the source and letting the individual tax payer claim the reinvestment
deductions at tax filing time.
The second issue arises from the applicability of the two-period result to
more finely divided (and more realistic) individual life-spans. Adding more
periods would make the technical analysis either more complicated or the
resulting tax system more complicated, while still keeping the validity of the
main arguments. With individuals living for more than two periods (and
potentially working for more than one period) the optimal tax system would
with high likelihood imply labor and capital income tax rates that vary
according to the age of the tax-payer. If this is not viewed politically feasible,
then the analysis should take into account the constant-rate constraint while
deriving the optimal tax formula. While this extension is not followed here,
it is easy to see that the main arguments of the paper would not change
if this constraint is taken into account: the optimal long run system would
still have no estate tax, but would have positive labor and capital income
taxes.
3.4 Heterogenous population and redistribution
It is a straightforward extension of the analysis above to extend the situ-
ation to handle heterogeneous population (where the types vary according
to their productivity) when a demogrant (lump sum amount of money) is
paid to each individual in the first period of their lives (so taxation is due to
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redistributive motive, and the taxes would be used even if the government
has no expenditure requirement). As in the previous analysis the long run
optimum does not feature taxation of estates.
The modified Ramsey-rule for taxation of capital and labor income derived
above would now be replaced by a modified many-person Ramsey rule (Di-
amond, 1975), where the relative induced distortion on capital income and
labor would also depend on the whether the dynasty with high marginal
social utility of income (typically the low productivity type) gets relatively
more income from sales of capital in the second period or from first-period
labor supply. What is the net eﬀect of a redistributive motive to the relative
tax rates on capital income and labor income on the steady state outcome
is not clear, since the long-run source of inequality is the diﬀering of labor
productivity and not capital income if the estates are taxed at suﬃciently
high rate along the transition path. The main eﬀect of redistributive mo-
tive is that it most likely (if we start from a situation where the high labor
productivity dynasty is the one with higher starting wealth, an empirically
plausible assumption), then the redistributive motive would lead to a higher
taxation of estates along the transition path to correct the wealth distribu-
tion.
3.5 Uncertain lifetimes and estate taxation
The optimal income taxation model of this paper relies on one assumption
about the bequests, that they are intended and that individuals know with
certainty their date of the death. With a slight additions to notation and
details, the model can capture the taxation of bequest of when the indi-
viduals have perfect access to annuity markets and where they rationally
annuitize their wealth to finance their end-of-life consumption and leave
only intended bequest. The analysis of partially accidental bequests would
complicate the steady-state analysis considerably even when starting from
representative agent world (at date zero), since one would need to find an
ergodic distribution of bequests to analyze the steady state.17
The polar opposite case of purely-accidental bequests in a representative
agent world is relative simple to handle. In that case, the accidental bequest
should be taxed away under most plausible assumptions for purely social
insurance reasons. This conclusion holds even in a steady-state model like the
17It can be shown that such ergodic distribution must have unbounded support.
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one presented in this paper and precisely because the unintended bequest are
taxed at 100% the analysis of a steady state model remains simple. However,
the taxation of unintended bequests becomes a harder question immediately
when one allows for heterogeneity of individuals in any dimensions. In their
“medium-run” analysis Blumkin and Sadka (2002) show that if other taxes
(like labor income tax) are used for redistributive purposes, it is possible that
the purely accidental bequests are not taxed at 100% in the social optimum,
because of the interaction of the accidental bequest with the redistribution
through labor income taxes.18 As a conjecture it is stated here, that in a
steady-state analysis of optimal taxation with heterogeneous population the
same results of potentially less than 100% tax on purely accidental bequests
should hold. It should be stressed that the main result of this paper, the
potential desirability of taxation of other capital income will not change
even if some bequests are accidental.
4 Political Equilibrium
In this section we seek to answer the following question: whether a standard
political economy model produces as an outcome a tax system resembling
the social optimal system derived in the previous section. The answer to
this question is negative and this is shown to be driven by lack of policy
commitment in a typical voting game. The point of this discussion is not to
reinvent the result that without policy commitment the tax system is biased
towards taxing capital in general. Instead the main point of this section is
to show that the composition of the capital taxes in our political economy
model is biased towards taxation of estates even in the long run.
4.1 Model of Political Economy
Our framework of the political economy is following. The economic environ-
ment is the model of the previous section with a continuum of representative
agents. To present the main result, we start with assumption of inelastic la-
bor supply; this assumption will later be relaxed. The government then uses
capital income tax and bequest tax to finance the revenue requirement. We
18The result of less than 100% estate tax requires assumptions about the relative mag-
nitudes of the elasticities of labor supply of high and low skill individuals evaluated at the
social optimum.
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assume that the government must meet its budget requirement each period.
Note that in this simplified model our optimal taxation analysis would imply
that in steady state all the tax revenue should be collected through capital
income taxes.
Each period, the government holds a referendum on the rate of estate tax.
The rate chosen will be the rate preferred by the median voter. The required
capital income tax is then chosen to balance the budget. We also assume
that the agents fully understand the structure and are able to predict the
tax rates and the whole future time-path of political-economic equilibrium
perfectly as a function of today’s choices.
Table 3: Timing of events through a life span of an individual.
Time period Phase Event
t 1 Birth and inheritance
2 Referendum and tax determination
3 Economic choices and consumption
t+ 1 4 Demographic transition in the other dynasty
5 Second referendum
6 Economic choices and consumption
t+ 2 7 Death and inheritance passed to next generation
The life-span of individual is explained in the Table 3. At phase 1 individual
is born and she receives an inheritance from the previous generation. At
phase 2 the referendum is held on the applicable estate tax rate applied
to the estates left by the current old and the capital income tax on the
present young is calculated. At phase 3 savings and estates are chosen
and consumption and labor supply occurs. At phase 4 the previous old
(from the unrelated dynasties) die and pass their estates are passed to newly
born agents. At phase 5 new referendum is held. Phase 5 is identical in
setting to phase 2, except now the individual born at time period t is an old
individual. At phase 6 she chooses second period consumption and bequests.
Consumption (and labor supply by the new young) also happen at phase 6.
At phase 7 the individual dies and passes her estate to her heirs.19
19The particular timing of the events is chosen so that the recipients of the inheritance
don’t get to vote. Allowing for the diﬀerent timing, we can always restore the result by
dividing the life-span of individual to more than two periods (and taking a stand on the age
of the receipt of inheritances) and assuming a shorter period of policy commitment. These
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Assume that initial capital holdings are s00 and s
0
1,where subscript denotes
period of life and superscript calendar time. Let
©
tkb
ª∞
k=0 be the sequence
of tax rates (given history up to k) that is most preferred by the respective
young voter in each period.
Result: The sequence outcome of the voting game is
©
tkb
ª∞
k=0.
Proof: With positive population growth, the median voter is always a young
agent.
This result means that the estate taxes are likely to be high in each pe-
riod. The reason for this (barring the very unlikely scenario that general
equilibrium eﬀects and dynamic feedback between elections overturn this
straightforward logic) is very simple: young voters prefer the tax to be paid
by someone else (old voters).
4.2 Discussion of the political equilibrium
The main driving assumptions in the political equilibrium in the previous
section were the importance of the median voter, one-dimensional policy
space and lack of policy commitment. We will discuss each of these below.
4.2.1 Median Voter Assumption
The median-voter model is not a necessary assumption to get the qualitative
result of the previous section. In the median voter model the policy is chosen
by (repeated) referendum. A standard alternative to the median-voter model
is the probabilistic-voting model (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2002), where
two parties compete for votes. Using the most standard assumptions of
probabilistic voting (neither party is inherently preferred on average by any
group and both young and old are equally mobile as voters), the driving force
of the result above (the dominance of the young voters’ objective over the
old voters’ in the outcome) disappears. However, due to the lack of policy
commitment, the equilibrium still features positive taxation of estates in the
long run. This follows since the social welfare function maximized by the
probabilistic voting mechanism would weight the utility of both generations
added complications will still capture the real world fact that the majority of population
is not about to receive nor leave bequest with a high probability during any given election
cycle.
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alive, and the young always prefer to tax estates and not their own savings.
Thus under this alternative modelling assumption the stark result of the
previous section is lost, but the bias away from the optimal taxation remains.
4.2.2 Two-dimensional policy space: Labor taxes
With elastic labor supply, labor taxes can be included among the available
policy tools without introducing lump-sum taxes. This extensions does not
change the qualitative conclusions: the bias towards high estate taxation
remains.
The median voter model can be extended to handle this situation through
the use of Structure-Induced Equilibrium (Persson and Tabellini 2002).20
Without loss of generality we can frame the referenda so that they are held
over the tax rate for capital gains and the tax rate for estates. This means
that the wage tax rate will be set to balance the budget.
A simple version of structure-induced equilibrium in this situation would
satisfy two conditions:
1) the tax rate on capital gains is the tax rate preferred by the median voter
holding the tax rate for estates constant and
2) the tax rate for estates is the tax rate preferred by the median voter
holding the tax rate for capital gains constant.
In principle the identity of the median voter in structure-induced equilibrium
models can be diﬀerent depending on the variable that the referendum is
referring to. However, in our setup, the median voter is always a young
voter since young are a larger group. Young voters like lower capital gains
taxes than the old and they like higher estate taxes than the old. Thus, the
result survives, young voters can use an estate tax strategy similar to the
one-dimensional case.
With probabilistic voting, the remarks are similar the previous case: in
this case, the young voter’s objective does not completely outweigh the old
voter’s objective in the outcome, but without policy commitment the young
20An example of a voting process that leads to structure-induced equilibrium is a process
where referenda over the two issues (two tax rates here) alternate and the voters vote
non-strategically (myopically) on the current issue holding the other variable (tax rate)
constant at the current level in forming their preferences.
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voters preference for positive estate taxation will still have an influence even
in the long run.
4.2.3 Policy commitment
If the sequential voting game is replaced by once-for-all voting in the first
period, where the voters actually choose the optimal path of the tax rates
from date zero to infinity then the main result of political economy part will
change. The result that estates are taxed in the long run in the sequential
voting equilibrium is a function of the fact that the tax rates are subject to
re-optimization (or change through the political process) every period. While
diﬀerent specifications of the once-for-all voting game would weight the odd
and even-period dynasties diﬀerently (so the welfare function maximized
would have diﬀerent welfare weights), the end result would be the same as
in our optimal tax problem: estates would not be taxed in the long run.
Assuming that the perfect policy commitment is not possible it becomes
interesting to speculate on the eﬀect of the length of the policy commitment
to the policy outcome. The shorter the time span between election periods
becomes (assuming that tax policy is potentially re-optimized every election
cycle), the more overwhelmingly is the median voter placed among voters
who prefer high estate taxes. Similarly in the probabilistic-voting model the
policy objective gets more biased towards high estate taxation when the
commitment period shortens. Thus the tendency for high estate taxation
should be larger when the tax rates are expected to be revised more often.
5 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is the result that optimal taxation
includes some taxation of capital income even in the long run in a dynastic
model with fully altruistic preferences. The reason for this is that if the tax
authority can treat realized capital gains and bequest diﬀerently, then the
realized capital gains should be taxed even in the long run (except when the
realized gains are reinvested). Thus the main policy conclusion of the paper
is that beyond the transition path argument for capital income taxation
(mostly concerned with wealth distribution) there is a separate economic
case to be made for more limited capital income taxation even in the most
capital income tax hostile model. Perhaps most interestingly, the argument
21
for capital income taxation given in this paper has almost nothing to do
with wealth redistribution nor has it anything to do with the correcting for
dynamic ineﬃciency due to a sub-optimal level of capital in the economy
that can arise in overlapping generations setting.
The political economy part of the model explains why there might be a
political bias in democracies to tax estates too heavily compared to other
capital income. This is shown to arise due to lack of intertemporal policy
commitment. Thus constitutional rules that provide more commitment in
tax policy across time (such as supermajority rules to change the relative
structure of taxation) could potentially be beneficial by moving the actual
tax policy closer to the optimal full-commitment tax policy.
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APPENDIX A: Proof of Result 1
Result 1: (No Estate Taxation in the Long Run) If α = β then q
t+2
0
qt0
=
pt+20
pt0
in the steady state. If β > α then q
t+2
0
qt0
< p
t+2
0
pt0
.
Proof:
Case 1 (α = β): The first order condition with respect to kt is
αt−1λt−1(1 + n) = αtλtf tk,
where f tk =
∂f(kt,−lt)
∂kt is the marginal productivity of capital. Advancing that
by one period and substituting gives:
αtλt(1 + n)2 = αt+2λt+2f
t+1
k f
t+2
k .
In steady state the endogenous variables are time-invariant modulo 2. This
means, that if the “odd-period” and “even-period” dynasties start at dif-
ferent endowment levels, then the steady state could imply a cycling with
periodicity 2 of the endogenous variables (so each consecutive members of
each dynasty would have the same outcome variables, but this equality does
not have to hold between the two dynasties).21
The first order conditions with respect to ct0 and c
t+2
0 are (without loss of
generality we can concentrate on the even-numbered dynasty):
21Given that redistribution between even and odd-period dynasties is costly in our
model, it is an open question whether the steady state has the property that all the even
and odd-numbered dynasties will have same outcome variables.
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In steady state these imply the following law of motion for λ :
λt+2 − λt =
βt
αt
µ
β2
α2
− 1
¶
ut0.
If the social discount equals the private discount rate (α = β), then λt+2 = λt
in steady state. Thus the steady state version of the law first-order condition
for capital on becomes:
αtλ˜(1 + n)2 = αt+2λ˜f tkf
t+2
k =⇒ f
t
kf
t+2
k =
(1 + n)2
α2
,
where λ˜ is the steady state value of λ for the relevant dynasty.
This is the regular Ramsey condition (the growth theory Ramsey-condition)
or the modified golden rule. The steady state dynastic first-order condition
∂ut/∂c0
qt0
= α2
∂ut+2/∂c0
qt+20
yields
qt+20
qt0
= α2.
The steady state producer price ratio between ct0 and c
t+2
0 is
pt+20
pt0
=
1
Πt+2i=1f
i
k
(1 + n)t+2
1
Πti=1f
i
k
(1 + n)t
=
(1 + n)2
f i+1k f
i+2
k
= α2,
where the last equality follows from the modified golden rule.
Case 2 (β > α): Using the steady state laws of motion for λ it follows
immediately that f tkf
t+2
k >
(1+n)2
α2 . Applying this inequality to the ratio of
producer prices calculations yields the result.
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APPENDIX B: Proof of Result 2
Result 2: (Modified Lifetime Ramsey Formulae) At the steady state the
optimal tax rates are implicitly defined by the following equations
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ + ϕ 1
ci0
∂ci0
∂I =
(qiw−piw)
qiw
η˜ci0,qiw +
(qi1−pi1)
qi1
η˜ci0,qi1
θ + ϕ 1
ci1
∂ci1
∂I =
(qiw−piw)
qiw
η˜ci1,qiw +
(qi1−pi1)
qi1
η˜ci1,qi1
θ + ϕ 1li
∂li
∂I =
(qiw−piw)
qiw
η˜li,qiw +
(qi1−pi1)
qi1
η˜li,qi1 ,
where e.g. η˜ci0,qiw is the compensated demand elasticity of first period con-
sumption with respect to net wage rate,
∂ci0
∂I is the derivative of first period
consumption with respect to unearned income (dynasty’s starting wealth)
and where θ and ϕ are constants independent of the time-period i.
Proof: The government’s optimal tax problem can be written as:
max
I
VE({qt0, qt1, qtw}t∈E, q00A0) + VO(q−11 , {qt0, qt1, qlw}t∈O, q−11 A−1)
subject to
(βtλt)
∞
t=0 : (1 + n)k
t+1 = f(kt,−lt)− ct0 −
ct−11
1 + n
−G,
where I = q−11 ∪
©
qt
0,q
t
1, q
l
w, k
t
ª∞
t=0
\
n
qT0 , q
T+1
0 , k
0
o
is the set of instruments
available for the government.
Without any loss of generality, we can concentrate on the optimal setting
of consumer prices for the “even-period” dynasty (the first order conditions
for even and odd-period consumer prices will be linked only through capital
levels, since the consumer demands depend only on the consumer prices
relevant to the dynasty). The first order conditions with respect to the
triple (qi0, q
i
1, q
i
w) (for i /∈ {0, T, T + 1}) are:
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(qi0) : − µEci0 +
X
t∈O
∙
βtλt
µ
f tl
∂lt
∂qi0
+
∂ct0
∂qi0
¶
+
βt+1λt+1
1 + n
∂ct0
∂qi0
¸
= 0
(qi1) : − µEci1 +
X
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βtλt
µ
f tl
∂lt
∂qi1
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∂ct0
∂qi1
¶
+
βt+1λt+1
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∂ct0
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¸
= 0
(qiw) : − µEciw +
X
t∈O
∙
βtλt
µ
f tl
∂lt
∂qiw
+
∂ct0
∂qiw
¶
+
βt+1λt+1
1 + n
∂ct0
∂qiw
¸
= 0,
where µE is the marginal utility of income and f tl is the marginal product of
labor at period t. In what follows, we will demonstrate how to modify the
first-order condition with respect to qi0 to yield a “Ramsey-type” first-order
condition. The required steps for qi1 and q
i
w are identical.
1. Substituting for λs and substituting in producer prices: The first order
conditions for the capital levels imply (using repeated substitutions)
that λt = λ0β−t 1Πti=1f ik
(1 + n)t. Using our definition of producer prices,
the first-order condition becomes:
−µEci0 + λ0
X
t∈O
∙
ptw
∂lt
∂qi0
+ pt0
∂ct0
∂qi0
+ pt1
∂ct0
∂qi0
¸
= 0.
2. (First standard Ramsey step) Adding and subtracting
ci0
³P
t∈O
∂lt
∂I +
t
0
∂ct0
∂I +
∂ct0
∂I
´
to the equation and then using Slutsky
Equation. This yields:ÃX
t∈O
∂lt
∂I
+
∂ct0
∂I
+
∂ct1
∂I
− µiE
!
ci0+λ0
X
t∈O
"
ptw
∂l˜t
∂qi0
+ pt0
∂c˜t0
∂qi0
+ pt1
∂c˜t1
∂qi0
#
= 0,
where e.g. ∂l˜
t
∂qi0
means the utility compensated (Hicksian) demand
derivative of lt with respect to qi0.
3. (Second standard Ramsey step) Adding
P
t∈O
h
qtw
∂l˜t
∂qi0
+ qt0
∂c˜t0
∂qi0
+ qt1
∂c˜t0
∂qi0
i
=
0 to the equation and using symmetry of the Slutsky matrix to arrive
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at standard dynastic Ramsey Rule.
θˆci0 + λ0
X
t∈O
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#
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¸
= 0
θ =
P
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qt0 − pt0
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∂qt0
+
¡
qt1 − pt1
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i
ci0
,
where the θˆ and θ are constants independent of ci0. The last equation
(there is a corresponding equation for ct0, c
t
1 and l
t) is the standard
dynastic Ramsey-rule, it calls for equal relative compensated changes
in demand due to tax system, as long as the compensated demands are
well approximated by first-order Taylor expansion around the no-tax
point (assuming also that the producer prices are unchanged by the
tax-system).
4. Using the proposition proved in the appendix C this can be rewritten
as (for the notation, see appendix C):
θ =
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∂qiw
+
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qt1 − pt1
¢ ³∂E˜i
∂qt1
/∂E
i
∂I
´i
ci0
=⇒ θ + ϕi 1
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¡
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+
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qi0 − pi0
¢ ∂c˜i0
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ci0
,
where ϕi is a generation specific constant.
Optimal tax rules can characterized by the following sets of equation (for
i /∈ {0, T, T + 1}):
27
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ + ϕi 1
ci0
∂ci0
∂I =
(qiw−piw)
∂c˜i0
∂qiw
+(qi0−pi0)
∂c˜i0
∂qi0
+(qi1−pi1)
∂c˜i0
∂qi1
ci0
θ + ϕi 1
ci1
∂ci1
∂I =
(qiw−piw)
∂c˜i1
∂qiw
+(qi0−pi0)
∂c˜i1
∂qi0
+(qi1−pi1)
∂c˜i1
∂qi1
ci1
θ + ϕi 1li
∂li
∂I =
(qiw−piw)
∂l˜i0
∂qiw
+(qi0−pi0) ∂l˜∂qi0
+(qi1−pi1)
∂l˜i0
∂qi1
li .
Considering this expression for the steady state (i > T + 1) simplifies it to:
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where e.g. η˜ci0,qiw is the compensated demand elasticity of first period con-
sumption with respect to net wage rate.
APPENDIX C: Implications of intertemporal sep-
arability on demand derivatives
The assumption of intergenerational additive separability has strong impli-
cations on the properties of the demand functions (through availability of
two-stage budgeting rules). This appendix derives an implication of the
additive separability that is used to derive the life-time Ramsey-rules. The
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proposition in this appendix is a straightforward extension of the Proposi-
tion 8 in Aura, Diamond and Geanakoplos (2002).22
Assumptions: Let consumer’s utility function be U({xi}Nn=0) =
NX
n=0
gn(xn),
whereN ≤ ∞ and each xn is a vector of consumption goods (with potentially
diﬀering number of consumption goods for diﬀerent values of n). Let the
prices of the good be given by the vectors given by set of price vectors
{pn}Nn=0. Let xij be the j’th element of the i’th consumption vector and pij
be the corresponding price. Let the income of the consumer be I. Let ∂x
ij
∂plm
be the Marshallian (uncompensated) demand derivative and let ∂x˜
ij
∂plm
be the
Hicksian (utility compensated) demand derivative.
Proposition: For i 6= l, ∂x˜ij
∂plm
= d∂x
ij
∂I and
∂x˜ik
∂plm
= d∂x
ik
∂I , where d is a
common factor of proportionality.
Proof: Let Ei be the amount of money spent on consumption of goods
in the i’th vector. Let vi(pi, Ei) = maxxi{gi(xi)|pi · xi = Ei) be the “sub-
indirect utility” corresponding to consumption of the goods in the i’th vector.
Now the dual of the consumer optimization can be stated as
min
{xn}n6=i,Ei
X
n6=i
pn · xn +Ei
subject toX
n6=i
gn(xn) + vi(pi, Ei) = u¯
Now it follows immediately that ∂x˜
ij
∂plm
= ∂x
ij
∂Ei
∂E˜i
∂∂plm
and ∂x˜
ik
∂plm
= ∂x
ik
∂Ei
∂E˜i
∂∂plm
where ∂E˜
i
∂∂plm
is the compensated expenditure derivative from the dual prob-
lem and ∂x
ij
∂Ei is the conditional demand function from the “sub-utility” max-
imization. Now if we similarly consider the consumer’s primal problem using
two state budgeting, we know that we can define income derivative of the
expenditure in the goods in the i’th vector as ∂E
i
∂I . Using the basic rules of cal-
culus for composite functions yields ∂x
ij
∂I =
∂Ei
∂I
∂xik
∂Ei or
∂xik
∂Ei =
∂xij
∂I /
∂Ei
∂I .Now
∂x˜ij
∂plm
and ∂x˜
ik
∂plm
can be written as ∂x˜
ij
∂plm
= ∂x
ij
∂I
³
∂E˜i
∂plm
/∂E
i
∂I
´
= d∂x
ij
∂I and
22The inclusion of this proof is for completeness. It should be noted that the results
presented here are well-known in the demand estimation literature (e.g. Deaton 1986).
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∂x˜ik
∂plm
= ∂x
ik
∂I
³
∂E˜i
∂plm
/∂E
i
∂I
´
= d∂x
ik
∂I , where d =
³
∂E˜i
∂plm
/∂E
i
∂I
´
. QED.
An immediate corollary of the theorem is that the same type of relationship
holds also between the derivatives of the regular demand functions.
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